This paper analyses the possible effects that would create for Latin American countries, the inclusion of an investment chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, currently in negotiation. The article discusses four aspects that are of particular importance given the divergence of interests between some of the negotiating States of the TPP: the substantive protection of foreign investment and its scope; domestic regulations on capital controls; the emergence of state entities as foreign investors; and the settlement of disputes through investor-state arbitration. The author concludes that compared to the current international investment agreements signed by the Latin America countries that are negotiating the TPP, the inclusion of an investment chapter in this agreement is an opportunity to advance in the convergence of the regulation foreign investment, both in terms of substantive standards of investment protection and to improve investor-state arbitration as a mechanism of dispute resolution.
INTRODUCTION
The so-called "Trans-Pacific Partnership" Agreement (TPP), is currently under negotiation among 12 countries of the Pacific Rim: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam, which together account for nearly 40 per cent of global GDP. The TPP aims at further liberalization of trade in the economies of the Asia-Pacific region, and intend to be an "innovative" and "high quality" treaty for the XXI century. 3 Because of the large number of economies involved and its markets, it has been praised as a way of providing "amazing" economic benefits, as well as a "genuine way of integrating" the Asia-Pacific region.
Internet users. 5 Considering those criticisms, some countries have tried to provide more transparency to the negotiations. For example, the Chilean Government has recently created an "Adjunct Room" providing information, dialogue, and debate with private organizations, NGOs and academia, among others that have directly expressed interest on the TPP. However, the information on the documents under negotiation is still limited.
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To date, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the benefits and harms of this treaty, since negotiations have been conducted in a confidential manner, and supposed features of the treaty derive from some official reports have been made public, 7 or that have been leaked online. 8 This contrasts with the recent negotiations between the US and the EU in the so-called Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) which is subject to regular reporting on an official site specially dedicated to that purpose in the European Union.
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In any case, the fact is that negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership include an investment chapter. The information available today shows that there are differences on how to address the protection of foreign investment, which is particularly important for Latin America, considering it is one of the areas most affected by investment arbitration and several of its economies comprising the Asia-Pacific region. This article will attempt to expose the magnitude of these differences, under the premise that the TPP does not innovate on the basics of international regulation of foreign investment among countries negotiating the agreement, and can be a valuable opportunity to advance convergence of substantive aspects of the protection of foreign investment in a balanced way, leaving more room for certain public policies, and recognizing the different role that states play as investors and regulators. The effectiveness and depth of this change will depend on the outcome of the negotiations.
II. THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
TPP negotiations have addressed the international regulation of foreign investment, a key issue for all participating countries. Although national laws and policies remain the most concrete and detailed part of the legal structure of foreign investment, the current system has come to rely increasingly on international investment agreements (IIAs), treaties that serve as instruments for the promotion, protection and liberalization of foreign investment by establishing standards of protection and treatment. 10 IIAs now exist in three major ways: bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed by two states; regional investment treaties (RITs) concluded by groups of countries in the same geographical area; and investment chapters integrated into free trade agreements (FTAs), signed either at the bilateral or regional level.
11 UNCTAD has reported that by the end of 2014, the regime of these agreements included a total of 2,923 BITs and 345 "other arrangements", totalling 3,268 international investment agreements, with a downward trend in bilateral investment treaties and upward in regional agreements, especially as part of FTAs.
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The legal framework of international investment agreements has also evolved significantly since the growing jurisprudence derived from the application of BITs and investment chapters in FTAs, raises new questions of interpretation and application, both for governments and for the investors from developed and developing countries. In any case, the TPP would include substantive and procedural protection for foreign investment provisions. Among them, there are four issues that are of particular importance given the divergence of interests between some of the negotiating States: the scope of protection of foreign investment; the rules on transparency of investment regimes and their disputes; the emergence of state entities and foreign investors; and especially the resolution of disputes through investor-state arbitration. We will discuss these aspects separately according to the limited information accessible to date.
A. The Scope of Protection of Foreign Investment in the TPP
As for the definition of foreign investment, there are concerns about its breadth, which is reflected in an open letter that a significant number of lawyers, academics, judges and members of legislatures, public service, business and other legal communities in Asia and the Pacific Rim signed 2012. In that letter, it is argued that a broad definition of "investment" that would be contained in the TPP, requires that a foreign investor to make a contribution to the economy of the host country, therefore extending the protection of foreign investments far beyond foreign direct investment (FDI), to include speculative financial instruments, government permits, public procurement, intangible contract rights, intellectual property and market share.
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However, this concern comes too late. The vast majority of countries participating in the TPP negotiations already incorporate broad definitions of investment and investor in IIAs concluded precisely with other countries in the Pacific Rim, so the TPP would not add more uncertainty in the breadth of that already existing protection.
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In fact, some have pointed out that the TPP investment chapter would limit preestablishment protection, included for long in U.S. investment agreements. 23 After defining investor of a Party as "a Party, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of another Party", with the purpose of providing "greater certainty" a footnote of Article II.1 clarifies what the parties understand when an investor "attempts to make" an investment, meaning that when that investor "has taken concrete action or actions to make an investment, such as channeling resources or capital in order to set up a business, or applying for permits or licenses". With respect to the definition of investment, the TPP leaked chapter characterize it as "every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk", including an enterprise; shares, stock and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; futures, options and other derivatives, turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenuesharing, and other similar contracts; intellectual property rights; licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens and pledges. However, this definition does not include an order or judgment entered in a judicial or administrative action.
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Again, this is not completely new for Chile, Mexico and Peru, as several IIAs concluded by these countries with TPP negotiating parties, include an identical definition of investment 30 or with minor variations. 31 However, some still follow the broad "classic"
asset-based BIT definition considering several groups of illustrative categories, without further explanation on the characteristics of the investment.
32

B. Substantive Protections of Foreign Investment in the TPP
Once defined its material scope, international investment agreements generally enshrine a series of obligations on States to ensure a stable and favourable environment for foreign investors business. These relate to the treatment that should be given to foreign investors and their investments in the host country by national authorities, so as to guarantee that foreign investors have the ability to perform certain key operations associated with their investment.
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In this context, the investment chapter of TPP recognizes the right of foreign investors to be protected from arbitrary expropriation; compensation for losses due to armed conflict, civil unrest or state of emergency; to the free transfer of payments related to a covered investment; and commitment to standards of protection under international investment law, such as national treatment (NT) and the most-favoured-nation (MFN), fair and equitable treatment (FET) and full protection and security (FPS). 42 Others stipulate that the concept of "fair and equitable treatment" does not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 43 We also found significant discrepancies between TPP negotiating countries on indirect expropriation and countries like New Zealand or Singapore do not always consider that provision in their investment agreements.
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The problem becomes even clearer if we analyse the Non-Binding Investment Principles of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) a forum that includes all TPP negotiating countries. While in these principles, adopted in 1994, it appears that APEC countries have a high degree of convergence on expropriation, agreeing that this can only be done for public purposes and on a non-discriminatory basis, granting 
Free Trade Commission (FTC) in 2001.
52 This is limited content of the FET standard has also been followed in the TPP investment chapter. 53 Similarly, recent Latin American TPP negotiating countries also have restricted the interpretation of what constitutes "indirect expropriation" -a measure or series of measures that has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure -stipulating that it must be determines on a case-by-case basis, considering among other factors: (i) the economic impact of a measure or a series of measures; (ii) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interferes with distinct, reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and (iii)the character of the measure or series of measures. Generally these agreements also consider that a measure or series of measures designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, does not constitute an indirect expropriation, except in rare circumstances, such as when is so severe in light of its purpose that it cannot be reasonably viewed to have been adopted and applied in good faith, or in a non-discriminatory basis. 54 Again, this is exactly the same path that it has been followed by the TPP investment chapter.
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However, this does not guarantee that arbitrators follow these restrictive criteria.
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Indeed, the substantive rights under investment chapters of FTAs and BITs have expanded significantly through the system of arbitration between investors and host states, as evidenced by arbitral jurisprudence that incorporates broad interpretations of these concepts. Certain of these interpretations have been considered as prioritizing the protection of property and economic interests of transnational corporations over the sovereign right of states to regulate and govern their own affairs.
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C. Domestic Regulations on Capital Controls
From the domestic regulations that may affect foreign investment, those related to capital controls have become even more relevant after the recent financial crisis. The vast majority of IIAs signed by the United States require the free flow of capital to and from the, without exception or restriction, even if those are implemented temporarily or for purposed of financial stability. Under these treaties, if the government of a country receiving investment from the United States restricts any flow of capital, may be subject to investor-state arbitration, and the host State should pay for the "damage" caused to the foreign investor. 58 This was evident in cases arising from the financial crisis in Argentina, a country that tried to impose a tax on capital outflows that it was considered equivalent to a "taking" in some ISDS cases interpreting the 1991 US-Argentina BIT. 59 However, other capital exporters also negotiating the TPP allow more flexibility in this area. Most BITs and FTAs negotiated by Japan and Canada, consider a safeguard that enables the host State to use its internal regulations to control capital accounts, or to prevent and mitigate financial crises. For example, the investment chapter of the 1196 FTA between Canada and Chile include an annex that allows the Chilean Central Bank to impose unremunerated reserve requirements ("encaje") on a foreign investment of an investor for the purpose of preserving the stability of the Chilean peso, 60 a provision that
Chile has continued to include in all its later IIAs.
Chile -and later Peru -secured in its preferential trade agreements with the United States some limited flexibility to implement capital controls under a "cooling clause". According to this provision, claims against Chile or Peru concerning the imposition of restrictive measures with regard to payments and transfers, are disallowed for one year after the events that give rise to the claim. If after that period an investor-State arbitration is initiated, loss or damage arising from the restrictive measure on capital inflows, are limited only to the reduction in value of the transfers, excluding loss of profits, loss of business or any similar consequential or incidental damages.
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Finding common ground in this area has been difficult, and some reports have mentioned that US negotiators have taken a strong stance against capital control measures in existing current TPP negotiations, taking an even more strict position that the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 62 In fact the IMF has expressed concern that restrictions on capital controls in US International Investment Agreements, may conflict with the IMF's authority to recommend capital controls in certain programs in selected countries, as has happened with Iceland among others. 63 Attempts to limit the flexibility given through "cooling clause" in the TPP, could be problematic, not only with Chile or Peru, but also with other negotiating countries, such as Malaysia, which often have resorted to capital controls. These countries may be especially reluctant to accept additional restrictions in this area, given the continued uncertainty in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis and the related concern of developing countries on the volatility of capital flows in the short term. 64 But seemingly, some common ground has been found. In the latest leaked TPP investment chapter are two approaches on temporary safeguard measures to this issue. The first stipulates that nothing in the agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining restrictive measures with regard to transfers or payments, and the movement of capital, in the event of serious balance of payments and external financial difficulties or threats thereof, or when cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties for macroeconomic management, in particular, the operation of monetary policy or exchange rate policy. However, any action taken in this regard must be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial interests of any other Party, not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances that triggered the restriction, and be temporary and be phased out progressively, as the situation improves. 65 This is drafting is highly linked to existing procedures set out in GATT and GATS agreements.
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A second "alternative" text is more focused on the protection of investments as, in addition to requirements previously mentioned for the implementation of such safeguards, requires that these measures be price-based, not confiscatory, not interfere with investors' ability to earn a market rate of return in the territory of the restricting Party; and not be used as a substitute for or avoid necessary macroeconomic adjustment, including exchange rate adjustment. Finally, this version excludes the use of safeguards measures to transfers associated with equity investments. 67 According to Hodgson in these negotiations there is a clear tension between "ensuring that States are able to take measures which they already have the right to take under the WTO agreements, and dealing with the fact that investment provisions generally restrict this flexibility".
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D. State entities and foreign investors in the TPP
There is a growing role of state-controlled entities such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWF) in the global investment. Despite increasing towards market liberalization and privatization observed trend in the last decade, the role of states has certainly grown in importance in some particular aspects of foreign investment.
In fact, the recent economic crisis emphasized the role that national governments and foreign investors can play. In particular, emerging economies have increased their investments abroad, mainly through SOEs and SWFs. This trend was reinforced in 2010 and 2011, when sovereign funds held sway despite the fears and turmoil that spread worldwide due to the global economic and financial crisis. 69 The year 2012, statecontrolled entities, remained important as foreign investors.
70
According to UNCTAD, the level of foreign direct investment that is coming from SWFs is small compared to the size of their assets, although it continues to expand in terms of assets, geographical spread and target industries. Conversely, while the number of SOEs that are trans-national companies (TNCs) is also relatively small, their importance is significant and some are among the largest TNCs in the world. UNCTAD has estimated there are at least 550 SO-TNCs with more than 15,000 foreign affiliated, foreign assets of over $2 trillion and FDI of more than $160 billion in 2013. Although these companies are less than 1% of the universe of TNCs, they account for over 11% of global FDI flows.
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The SWFs and SOEs have grown in importance as foreign investors in recent years. The SWF come mostly from countries of the Pacific Rim as Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Chile. However, these economies do not always have the same standards of transparency or destination of investment funds. For example, Canada and New Zealand -involved in a wide range of investments including bonds, equities, and commodities through SWFs -have enacted transparency provisions with respect to the investment criteria and financial accounting of its SWF. In addition to transparency measures, investment from Malaysia and Singapore SWFs, pursue strategic objectives, focusing on industries operating within its national interest.
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TPP negotiating countries have faced some problems in reaching an agreement concerning the protection of SOEs and SWFs as foreign investors. Although the definition of "enterprise" includes any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately or governmentally owned or controlled, 73 with respect to SOEs, United States and Australia have proposed requiring that SOEs effectively operate commercially and do not obtain benefits from their condition, such as preferential access to subsidies, state loans or operating licenses. Vietnam has expressly opposed this, and Malaysia can also be against some of these provisions. The dispute would focus mainly on whether regulation should focus on the state as such body or in his eventual "anticompetitive" behaviour. 74 The regulation of SOEs and SWFs has been cited as a major stumbling block to progress on the TPP negotiations. 75 Australia and the US could try to establish a link between the TPP and the Principles and Generally Accepted Practices (GAPP) on SWF (or "Santiago Principles") which were presented by the IMF on 11 October 2008. The Santiago Principles include a set of twenty voluntary principles for sovereign wealth funds to ensure its competitiveness in global financial markets that promote independence in investment decisions, transparency and state accountability. 76 Another aspect that may arise in the TPP negotiations with respect to state-controlled entities is their ability to use investor-state arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism which is available to them in most IIAs. 77 A guideline for this debate could be found in the Non-Binding Investment Principles of APEC. According to these principles members of the forum should minimize regulatory and institutional barriers to outward investment, and are encouraged to avoid double taxation in relation to foreign investment. 78 With respect to the settlement of disputes, these can be solved through consultation or negotiation between the parties. If the dispute remains unresolved, these principles recognize the right of the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with international obligations or any other acceptable approach.
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E. Investor-State Arbitration in the TPP
Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of the TPP negotiations is related to the settlement system of investor-state disputes through international arbitration, which has faced various criticisms in recent years and resistance to inclusion in TPP by New Zealand and particularly Australia.
The vast majority of IIAs allows foreign investors to have direct recourse to international arbitration against the host State, when they have been affected in certain the substantive rights recognized in those treaties. This mechanism of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is expressly supported by business groups such as the US Business Coalition for the TPP, among others.
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As the use of investor-state arbitration has increased dramatically -especially in Latin America -the ability of foreign investors to choose this system has gradually found under greater scrutiny. Critics of the regime often point that allows private arbitrators decide on the legality of the sovereign acts or public policies and there are concerns about its high costs, the possibility of "forum shopping", their deficits in transparency, rights of third parties and criticism of its lack of predictability and consistency. 81 Some scholars have strongly criticized the regime, emphasizing that "the arbitration of investment treaties, as currently constituted, is not a fair, independent and balanced for dispute settlement investment method, which you should not rely on it for this purpose". 82 This should be a concern for the TPP negotiating countries.
US non-governmental organizations like Public Citizen, the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth have called for a model agreement that protects the environment, rights of workers and the general public interest. 83 The same concerns have been raised by environmental groups in New Zealand. 84 If this new approach is followed in the TPP, there would be a need to eliminate or decrease dramatically the provisions of the agreements providing for ISDS.
Following the filing of an investor-State arbitration concerning the plain-packaging of cigarettes, 85 Australia announced that it would not accept the inclusion in its trade agreements of procedures to settle disputes between investors and the Australian State through arbitration, which would extend to the TPP. The Productivity Commission of the Government of Australia was particularly critical of this mechanism, noting that foreign investors already have several ways to insure themselves against the risks of investing abroad, and identifying various potential risks for the host states, like a "regulatory chill" (for fear of triggering claims arising in arbitration), as well as other concerns related to the arbitration (institutional bias, conflict of interests of arbitrators, lack of transparency and excessive compensation granted to foreign investors). 86 However, a later change of government in Australia marked a slight change in that policy, as evidenced by the fact that the FTA between Australia and South Korea, the negotiation was completed in early December 2013, included investor-State arbitration. 87 However, a more recent Australia-Japan FTA does not include ISDS provisions. 88 The Australian government has recently declared that the inclusion of ISDS clauses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. 89 In any case, it can be argued that Australia does not have a consistent position on this matter. While the Australia-US FTA does not contain an ISDS provision, 90 other FTAs concluded by Australia -such as with Singapore -they consider that dispute settlement mechanism between a foreign investor and the host State. Moreover, it remains to be seen how far Australia's rejection of ISDS in the TPP will influence other negotiating parties. One of the arguments that Australia has used to try to persuade other parties to not include investor-State arbitration in the investment chapter, is the claim that it will not necessarily ensure foreign direct investment into TPP countries, which backed-up through an independent study. The proliferation of investment disputes (and some questionable awards), has progressively led some governments to question the benefits of ISDS. However, it has not articulated a clear alternative to investor-state arbitration, which on the one hand, aims to take disputes outside the possibly arbitrary political sphere of diplomatic protection, and on the other, from possibly not neutral national courts. International investment arbitration process has deficiencies and the substantive rules applied need refinement. But some argue that it is preferable to improve the system rather than abandon it. 97 In fact, certain "BITs models" include broad exceptions for measures taken by governments to protect national health, public morals, welfare and sustainable development. 98 Agreements concluded by TPP negotiating countries also provide for these exceptions, like NAFTA, US-Peru FTA and Economic Cooperation Agreement between Singapore and Japan. 99 The TPP reportedly declares that nothing in the investment chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health, or other regulatory objectives. 100 As there are different levels of acceptance of ISDS and IIAs between the TPP negotiating countries, a definitive agreement on these issues may be difficult. Negotiators will have to consider technical issues related to ISDS, such as whether TPP countries can innovate with respect to access and investment arbitration proceedings in a manner that preserves policy space, maintain the protection of the legitimate interests of the investors, for example, through filter mechanisms be designed to exclude frivolous lawsuits or to circumscribe the scope of what is actionable. 101 Opposition to investment arbitration, or in the alternative, to national courts to decide the investor-state disputes is not exceptional. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) found that both the investor-state arbitration, as the use of national courts is unduly burdensome and delaying options. UNCTAD has expressed a preference on measures of conflict management and dispute prevention in light of the differences, sometimes irreducible between the state and the interests of foreign investors. 
